The United States government under President Donald Trump is considering a fundamental change to its arms policy toward Turkey. As announced at a NATO summit in Ankara on July 7, 2026, the American leadership is considering lifting existing sanctions and potentially releasing F-35 stealth fighter jets.
This announcement could pave the way for Ankara's reintegration into the international arms program, from which the country was excluded in 2019. A key condition for any agreement remains the continued presence of the Russian S-400 air defense system acquired by Turkey. Transferring this system to a third country is currently being discussed as an option, although no concrete contractual agreements have yet been reached. The announced measures are meeting with reservations in the US Congress and among regional partners such as Israel, and mark a period of intensive diplomatic realignment within the transatlantic alliance.
The causes of the arms conflict and the S-400 system
Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019 resulted from Ankara's decision to acquire and deploy the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. The U.S. administration at the time, along with military experts, argued that the simultaneous operation of the Russian radar system and the advanced American stealth aircraft posed a significant security risk. There were concerns that sensitive data about the F-35's flight characteristics and radar signature could be intercepted by the Russian system and potentially transmitted to Moscow. In response, the United States imposed sanctions in 2020 under the Combating America's Adversaries by Sanctions Act, known as CAATSA.
Against this backdrop, Donald Trump's statement during his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan represented a clear departure from previous diplomatic policy. However, Turkey's rejoining the Lockheed Martin-led consortium is contingent upon legal and technical conditions. As long as the S-400 system remains physically in Turkey, US law prohibits its transfer. The proposal to transfer the system to a third country is considered a possible compromise in negotiating circles. Such a transaction, however, could be thwarted by contractual clauses of the Russian Federation, as Russian arms exports typically include strict end-user guarantees that legally block any transfer without Moscow's consent.
Legal framework and parliamentary resistance in the USA
The implementation of the measures announced by Donald Trump requires not only an administrative decision but also the approval of the legislative bodies in Washington. In the 2020 National Defense Act, the US Congress enshrined restrictive provisions that explicitly prohibit the delivery of the F-35 to Turkey until the US government officially certifies that Ankara no longer possesses any Russian missile systems. This legal hurdle limits the president's foreign policy options and compels the administration to coordinate closely with lawmakers.
In parliamentary committees, bipartisan resistance is already forming against the White House's plans. A group of Democratic and Republican lawmakers is demanding that the arms embargo be maintained as long as Turkey does not take irrevocable steps to remove the S-400 system. The lawmakers emphasize that relaxing the criteria could weaken the credibility of American sanctions regimes and jeopardize the technological integrity of modern weapons systems. This domestic debate highlights the tension between executive foreign policy and the parliamentary oversight function in the United States.
Regional security interests and Israel's position
The potentially altered arms balance in the Eastern Mediterranean is also prompting reactions from allies outside NATO. The Israeli government has reportedly expressed significant concerns about the delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey. Israel operates a modified version of the aircraft, the F-35I Adir, and has traditionally pursued a strategy of maintaining a qualitative military edge in the region. Modernizing the Turkish air force with identical technology is viewed in Tel Aviv as a potential shift in the regional balance of power, particularly given the volatile diplomatic relations between Ankara and Israel in recent years.
Before its exclusion from the program, the Turkish government played a significant role as an industrial partner. Turkish suppliers were firmly integrated into the global supply chain and produced essential components for the F-35's fuselage and engines. Unwinding this industrial involvement incurred considerable costs and logistical adjustments for the entire consortium. Resuming cooperation would therefore also require the reintegration of Turkish industry, which industry observers consider organizationally challenging due to the long hiatus.
Alternative arms projects and the development of Turkish domestic production
While negotiations with Washington stagnated for years, Turkey has made considerable efforts to reduce its military dependence on foreign suppliers and establish alternative procurement channels. In addition to ongoing negotiations for the purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets, Ankara is pushing ahead with the development of its own fifth-generation fighter jet. This project, codenamed Kaan and being developed by Turkish Aerospace, forms the centerpiece of Turkey's long-term defense planning.
The rapprochement between the United States and Turkey in the run-up to the NATO summit was already evident in another arms deal. The American government approved the sale of General Electric F110 engines worth approximately $700 million, intended for prototype construction and the first production phase of the Kaan program. Observers interpret this approval as a signal that Washington, despite the unresolved F-35 issue, is interested in a gradual improvement of military cooperation. The parallel between the expansion of its own industry and the pursuit of American high technology demonstrates the dual orientation of Turkish defense policy, which seeks to consolidate its position as a regional power through both cooperation and independence.