In the debate surrounding the future combat capabilities of the German Air Force and the continuation of the prestigious European Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, a prominent industry expert has weighed in. Tom Enders, former CEO of Airbus and EADS and current board member of the AI and drone developer Helsing, strongly warns the German government against initiating a purely national fighter jet program.
In a guest article for the German editorial network RND on February 23, 2026, Enders argued that such a step would cost hundreds of billions of euros without significantly increasing military capability in the foreseeable future. Given growing industrial and political tensions between the partner nations of Germany, France, and Spain, Enders advocates for a radical prioritization of unmanned aerial systems and artificial intelligence. His warning comes at a time when even the German government leadership under Chancellor Friedrich Merz is publicly questioning the relevance of the manned core component of FCAS, while industry is searching for viable ways out of the current impasse.
Economic risks and delays of a national jet program
Developing a modern, sixth-generation fighter jet represents one of the greatest technological and financial challenges facing any industrialized nation. Enders, in his analysis, cites the US F-35 program as a benchmark, whose total costs have exceeded $400 billion. Even with a conservative estimate, Germany would have to invest hundreds of billions of euros in the research and development phase alone for an in-house development. The former Airbus CEO clarifies that while the technological expertise exists within the country, economic realities argue against it. Such a project would place a massive burden on defense budgets for decades and block other necessary procurements.
Enders is particularly critical of the timeframe. He argues that operational readiness of a purely German jet would be virtually impossible before the end of the 2040s. This would mean the system would arrive too late to address current security policy challenges. Enders therefore describes such a project as a national prestige project that would not make any direct contribution to the combat effectiveness of the air force. The Bundeswehr, he believes, needs solutions that are effective in the short and medium term, rather than tying up resources in a technologically risky long-term project whose relevance could be rendered obsolete by new technologies by the end of its development cycle.
The drone as a primary defense instrument
Instead of focusing on developing a new manned fighter jet, Enders advises Berlin to invest heavily in unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomy, software, and AI-controlled systems. He sees these fields as the real revolution in aerial warfare. As a member of the board of Helsing, he points to recent successes in autonomous test flights in cooperation with the Swedish manufacturer Saab. These technologies are already available today or are at a stage where they can be brought to operational readiness significantly faster than a complex fighter jet.
According to Enders, the focus on scalable production and software excellence is key to strategic sovereignty. While the development of manned platforms is becoming increasingly expensive and time-consuming, drone swarms and autonomous escort aircraft offer a cost-effective way to secure air superiority or carry out complex missions without endangering pilots' lives. These capabilities must be integrated into the armed forces well before the 2040s to avoid falling behind technologically.
Political uncertainty and diverging demands
The debate is further fueled by the stance of Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Merz recently expressed doubts as to whether the German Air Force even needs a sixth-generation manned jet anymore. Furthermore, discussions with France reveal a significant discrepancy in the requirements. While Paris demands a system capable of carrying nuclear weapons and suitable for deployment on aircraft carriers, Germany's priorities lie more with continental air defense and integration into existing NATO structures.
While Merz had raised the possibility of German aircraft carrying French or British nuclear weapons as part of a European deterrence strategy, the industrial implementation of this vision within the FCAS framework is proving difficult. Differing national interests have led to a standstill in the so-called New Generation Fighter Pillar, the manned component of FCAS. This political stalemate is prompting considerations of moving away from the existing structure and exploring alternative partnerships.
Alternative collaborations and the two-jet solution
Tom Enders does not completely rule out German participation in future manned projects, but sees other partners as more promising. He cites the British-led Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) or closer cooperation with Sweden as potential options for the next generation of manned combat aircraft. These programs, he argues, might be better aligned with German needs in their objectives and industrial structures than the current arrangement with France.
Meanwhile, Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has expressed openness to a pragmatic solution to salvage the FCAS project. He proposed a two-jet solution, in which France and the German-Spanish teams would develop different aircraft types based on a shared technological architecture. This would include drones, data links, and the so-called Combat Cloud. However, Faury cautioned against relying too early on a purely unmanned solution, as this could create a dangerous capability gap for Europe before autonomous systems are fully mature.
Industrial competition and technological sovereignty
The debate surrounding FCAS and potential national alternatives touches upon the core of the European defense industry. Experts fear that a failure of the trilateral cooperation would further exacerbate the fragmentation of the European defense landscape. At the same time, Enders' initiative demonstrates that parts of the industry are already thinking beyond traditional aviation. In modern combat scenarios, the importance of software and artificial intelligence increasingly surpasses that of the aircraft itself.
Berlin's decision will depend largely on how priorities are set between industrial participation, military necessity, and financial feasibility. Pressure from actors like Enders increases the likelihood that the German government will reallocate its investments. Increased involvement in autonomous air systems could secure Germany a leading technological position without having to bear the financial risks of a manned, unilateral approach. The coming months will reveal whether the FCAS partner nations can reach a compromise or whether the strategic paths in European air defense will ultimately diverge.